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Abstract: This paper discusses the relation between νοῦς (the knowledge of scientific 
principles) and ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική (the knowledge of demonstrable truths) in Aristotle’s 
philosophy of science. I argue against “rationalist” interpretations, dominant in the secondary 
literature, which claim that the principles can be known as such independently of their causal 
connections to demonstrable truths. However, alternative interpretations imply that νοῦς and 
ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική are somehow interdependent, a view that seems in conflict with the 
fact that νοῦς is, according to Aristotle, more “accurate” than ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική. Thus, I 
offer a construal of the relation between these two cognitive states and explain in which sense 
they can be taken as interdependent without contradicting Aristotle’s claim about their 
“accuracy” or rendering his theory viciously circular. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For Aristotle, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some 
propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means they are known by 
“demonstration” (ἀπόδειξις), a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of 
the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called 
“demonstrative knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική).1 However, not all propositions in a 
scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable 
principles, whose knowledge is called “comprehension” (νοῦς).2 If the knowledge of all 
scientific propositions were demonstrative, demonstrations would either (i) be extended ad 
infinitum or (ii) proceed “in a circle and reciprocally” (An. Post. 1.3. 72b17–18). The first 
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option would make scientific knowledge impossible, since an infinite series of premises 
could not “be surveyed with thought.”3 The second alternative depends on scientific truths 
being mutually explanatory, a solution Aristotle rejects (An. Post. 1.3, 72b25–73a20).4 
Aristotle also affirms that νοῦς is the most “accurate” (ἀκριβές) of all cognitive states, 
including demonstrative knowledge (An. Post. 2.19, 110b5–14)—hereafter, I shall refer to 
this thesis as the “Accuracy Claim.”5 This claim is motivated by the fact that the principles 
are “better known” (γνωριμώτεραι) than the respective conclusions (An. Post. 2.19, 100b9–
10). In other passages, Aristotle also describes them as “prior” (πρότερα)6 and “more 
convincing” (An. Pr. 2.16, 64b32–33). His reason to speak in these terms seems to be an 
asymmetrical dependence relation between νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική: while the 
principles are “known” and “convincing” in themselves, demonstrable truths only become 
“known” and “convincing” because the principles from which they are explained are 
themselves “known” and “convincing” (Top. 1.1, 100b20–21; An. Pr. 2.16, 64b35–36). If so, 
Aristotle argues, we must say that the principles are “better known” and “more convincing” 
than the conclusions they explain (An. Post. 1.2, 72a29–32). 
The most natural reaction to this picture is to take Aristotle as advancing a 
foundationalist doctrine and, more specifically, a rationalist theory of epistemic justification. 
A demonstration would be an inference that allows us to determine the truth-value of 
problematic propositions from premises previously known to be truths.7 Ultimately, 
demonstrable propositions are deductively derived from immediate truths that have been 
grasped in advance and in some independent way.8 Whereas ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική is an 
inference-based knowledge of non-evident truths, νοῦς is an intuitive and non-inferential 
recognition of self-evident propositions, which are obtained independently of their 
explanatory connections to other propositions in the domain.9 Since our knowledge of the 
principles cannot depend “upon the confirmation by what deductively follows from them, let 
alone upon their confirmation by what we observe,” we can think of Aristotle as “the 
paradigm of an extreme rationalist.”10 
This dominant interpretation, which I shall refer to as the “Rationalist Account,” has 
been criticised by another group of interpreters that formulates Aristotle’s notion of scientific 
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knowledge in terms of “interrelatedness.” Knowing a proposition scientifically is 
understanding how it fits into a web of interrelated truths, either as an indemonstrable 
principle (noetic knowledge) or as a demonstrable fact (demonstrative knowledge).11 To have 
comprehension (νοῦς) of a first principle involves recognizing it as a first principle, which 
means that a scientist does not have noetic knowledge of a principle p unless she knows that 
there are other propositions in the domain that can be demonstrated from p, while there are no 
propositions from which p could be demonstrated.12 In this “Interrelational Account,” as I 
shall call it, the acquisition of scientific knowledge does not consist in inferring non-evident 
facts from self-evident principles so much as in organizing in terms of explanatory priority 
propositions previously recognized as truths. 
However, the Interrelational Account must face an objection against which the 
Rationalist Account seems fully protected. If we cannot achieve comprehension unless we 
grasp the principles as explanations of demonstrable truths, there is a sense in which noetic 
and demonstrative knowledge are interdependent cognitive states.13 If both kinds of 
knowledge are obtained only when a complex body of truths has been collected and 
organized in terms of explanatory connections, then, as David Bronstein puts it, “when we 
finally acquire demonstrative and non-demonstrative (noetic) scientific knowledge, we 
acquire them at the same time and by the same activity.”14 This view is challenged by 
Aristotle’s Accuracy Claim, which states that comprehension is “more accurate” than (and in 
a certain way independent of) demonstrative knowledge. In contrast, the proponent of the 
Rationalist Account can easily explain this claim as the recognition of an asymmetrical 
dependence relation between the two cognitive states. The evidence of the theorems (of 
which we have demonstrative knowledge) depends on the evidence of the principles (of 
which we have noetic knowledge), but not vice-versa. After all, if noetic and demonstrative 
knowledge are interdependent cognitive dispositions, what does it mean to say that the former 
is “more accurate” than the latter? 
My main aim in this article is to argue for an interpretation of the Accuracy Claim that 
is compatible with the Interrelational Account—at least in the way I shall frame it below. 
However, this goal requires a preliminary discussion. The explanation of the Accuracy Claim 
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provided by the Rationalist Account is almost an immediate consequence of the way it 
interprets Aristotle’s theory of demonstration as a whole. If so, rejecting this explanation 
amounts to rejecting the Rationalist Account altogether. For this reason, in section 2 below, I 
discuss passages that might be used to support the Rationalist Account and its explanation of 
the Accuracy Claim. Then, in section 3, I argue that this reading is not in tune with the way 
Aristotle describes the grasp of first principles and present my reasons for preferring the 
Interrelational Account. More specifically, I shall point out a drawback that often goes 
unnoticed even by critics of rationalist interpretations: the initial temptation to characterize 
Aristotle as a rationalist is due to a confusion between two different kinds of infinite regress 
that threat the acquisition of scientific knowledge. Finally, in section 4, I argue for a new way 
of understanding the Accuracy Claim. Additionally, I try to specify in which sense noetic and 
demonstrative knowledge can be taken as interdependent without rendering Aristotle’s theory 
viciously circular. Section 5 closes the discussion with some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Considering the Rationalist Account 
 
One of Aristotle’s claims in An. Post. 2.19 is that our intellectual journey towards the 
principles begins with perception (αἴσθησις [An. Post. 2.19, 99b34–35]). Making use of 
inductive reasoning (An. Post. 2.19, 100b3–5), in alliance with other capacities such as 
memory (μνήμη [An. Post. 2.19, 100a3–4]) and experience (ἐμπειρία [An. Post. 2.19, 100a4–
6]), we end up acquiring comprehension (νοῦς) of indemonstrable premises and, 
consequently, demonstrative knowledge of the facts that can be proved from them. One could 
affirm that Aristotle is offering an empiricist account of the acquisition of scientific 
principles, which would be by itself sufficient to reject any interpretation that depicts him as a 
rationalist. However, it has been persuasively argued in the literature that, even though 
Aristotle ascribes some role to perception in the process, he could not be saying that sensible 
experience alone works as the foundation of noetic knowledge.15 If sensible experience were 
the foundation of our knowledge of the principles, the truths known by perception and 
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induction would have to be “more convincing” and “better known” than the principles 
themselves (An. Post. 1.2, 72a25–b4). If so, sensible experience would be more accurate than 
noetic knowledge, which is impossible given the Accuracy Claim.16 If we cannot use sensible 
experience to justify scientific knowledge, Aristotle cannot be an empiricist in the strict sense 
of the term. On the contrary, he seems to believe that νοῦς, understood as a sort of “intuition” 
or “mental vision,” has to intervene and complete the job that sensible experience alone is not 
able to accomplish.17 
Proponents of the Rationalist Account have argued that Aristotle appeals to this 
intuitive faculty in An. Post. 2.19 in order to protect scientific knowledge from the threat of 
infinite regress. In fact, this worry seems to be present in the very first lines of the treatise: 
 
<ext> 
[T1] All teaching [διδασκαλία] and all learning [μάθησις] of a rational kind [διανοητικὴ] 
proceed from pre-existent knowledge [ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως]. . . . Similarly 
with arguments, both deductive and inductive: they effect their teaching through what we 
already know. (An. Post. 1.1, 71a1–7, translation modified) 
</ext> 
 
This passage has been described as “anti-foundationalist in spirt.”18 In fact, one may think 
that T1 implies that every piece of knowledge depends on some pre-existent knowledge19, a 
statement that gives rise to infinite regress. However, what Aristotle actually says is that 
every “rational learning” (μάθησις διανοητικὴ) is based on previous knowledge. Therefore, a 
problem of infinite regress arises only if we assume that every “rational learning” depends on 
pre-existing knowledge whose acquisition is itself “rational.” 
The brief note about arguments in T1 strongly suggests that by μάθησις διανοητικὴ 
Aristotle means inference-based learning, since we learn by argument when the knowledge of 
the conclusion is somehow based on previous knowledge of the premises. If so, all Aristotle 
needs in order to protect his theory against infinite regress is to identify a non-inferential 
cognitive state that allows us to start off the process of rational learning without depending on 
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pre-existent knowledge.20 The proponents of the Rationalist Account may argue that this is 
precisely the task Aristotle takes on in An. Post. 1.3.21 In this chapter, he argues that 
demonstrative sciences do not run the risk of infinite regress because there are basic 
propositions in their domains (the first principles) from which other propositions can be 
demonstrated, but which are not themselves known by demonstration. Of those principles the 
scientist has not ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική, but νοῦς. If noetic knowledge is the kind of cognition 
that protects Aristotle’s theory against the infinite regress diagnosed in T1, it must be “some 
sort of non-inferential intuition” of “self-evident principles,” which “must be grasped as true 
and necessary when considered in themselves, with no reference to anything else.”22 
This picture allows the Rationalist Account to offer a perfectly simple explanation for 
the Accuracy Claim, according to which comprehension is “more accurate” (ἀκριβέστερον) 
than demonstrative knowledge. In fact, Aristotle takes ἀκριβές as a synonym for σαφές (Top. 
2.4, 111a8–10), which indicates that noetic knowledge is “more accurate” than demonstrative 
knowledge in the sense of having a higher degree of clarity or certainty. In addition, Aristotle 
associates the Accuracy Claim with the fact the principles are “more familiar” or “better 
known” than the conclusion: 
 
<ext> 
[T2] Again, the principles of demonstrations are better known [γνωριμώτεραι], and all 
[demonstrative] knowledge involves an account [μετὰ λόγου]. Hence there will not be 
[demonstrative] knowledge of the principles; and since nothing apart from comprehension 
can be truer than [demonstrative] knowledge, there will be comprehension of the principles. 
(An. Post. 2.19, 100b9–12, translation modified) 
</ext> 
 
Of course, one may argue that the principles are “better known” and “more clear” by nature 
(τῇ φύσει) and not to us (πρὸς ἡμᾶς [An. Post. 1.2, 71b33–72a5; Ph. I 1, 184a16–21]). 
However, Aristotle also says that a demonstration proceeds from things that are “more 
convincing” (πιστοτέρων [An. Pr. 2.16, 64b32–33]), a feature he explicitly associates with the 
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fact that the premises are “better known than” and “prior to” the conclusion (An. Post. 1.25, 
86b27–30). Even if what makes a proposition an indemonstrable principle is how things are 
ordered in the world, each principle must be “convincing itself in its own right,” whereas the 
theorems become convincing only “through other things” (Top. 1.1, 100b20–21; cf. An. Post. 
1.2, 72a25–b4). 
The other remark associated with the Accuracy Claim in T2 is that demonstrative 
knowledge is μετὰ λόγου (An. Post. 2.19, 100b10). One might plausibly argue that Aristotle 
is contrasting the accuracy of noetic knowledge with the inferential nature of demonstrative 
knowledge: knowing a demonstrable fact requires inference from previously known 
principles, while knowing the principles does not involve inferring them from more basic 
premises.23 In An. Post. 1.27, 87b34–35, Aristotle affirms that sciences requiring a smaller 
number of premises in order to demonstrate their theorems are “more accurate.” The idea 
behind this statement might be that the more complex is an inference to prove p, the less 
“accurate” is the knowledge of p. In virtue of being non-inferential, noetic knowledge is the 
most accurate of all cognitive states, since the principles require zero premises in order to be 
known. For all these reasons, we might think that the Accuracy Claim is just Aristotle’s way 
of pointing out that his foundationalist project would fail if comprehension were not an 
intuitive apprehension of self-evident truths that can be grasped independently of their 
explanatory connections to other propositions.24 In other words, the Accuracy Claim is meant 
to recognize an asymmetrical dependence relation between noetic and demonstrative 
knowledge. Let me now spell out why, despite all these reasons, I think the Rationalist 
Account is untenable. 
 
 
3. The Advantages of the Interrelational Account over the Rationalist Account 
 
The main reasons set out against the Rationalist Account are well known. First of all, it seems 
inadequate to take Aristotle’s theory of demonstration as a doctrine on epistemic justification. 
According to the philosopher, we cannot ask why (διὰ τί) a proposition is true unless we 
Preprint Version: forthcoming in the Journal of the History of Philosophy 
8 
 
already known that (ὅτι) it is true (An. Post. 2.1, 89b23–35; 2.8, 93a26–27). If a 
demonstration is meant to explain the conclusion, the scientist must already know that the 
conclusion is true before she enters the demonstrative stage of the scientific enterprise. In 
fact, the distinction between τὸ ὅτι and τὸ διὰ τί should not be explained in terms of 
unjustified versus justified beliefs (An. Post. 1.13, 78a22–b4). Justifications are answers to 
questions such as “why do I believe that p?,” whereas Aristotelian demonstrations address 
questions such as “why is it the case that p?”25 All I need to justify my belief that p is true is 
to set out reasons for believing that p is true. On the other hand, to present a demonstration of 
p is to identify a real-world factor that is responsible for p being true, and not a subjective 
factor responsible for my belief that p is true.26 After all, the principles are prior to and more 
familiar than the theorems “by nature” and not “to us,” which means that what determines the 
role of a given truth in a demonstrative science is not how accessible to us is the evidence for 
it, but how fundamental it is in the causal order of reality (An. Post. 1.2, 71b30–72a5).27 If 
what makes a proposition a principle is that it stands for a causally fundamental fact, knowing 
a principle as such involves grasping its explanatory connections to other truths in the 
domain, as argued by the Interrelational Account. 
Still, even the critics of the Rationalist Account sometimes neglect what I believe to 
be the main reason to reject its explanation of the Accuracy Claim. In An. Post. 2.19, Aristotle 
considers two different hypotheses about the origin of our knowledge of the principles: 
 
<ext> 
[T3] As for knowledge of the immediates, one might wonder . . . whether the states, not being 
present in us, come about in us or rather are present in us without being noticed. It is absurd 
to suppose that we possess such states; for then we should possess pieces of knowledge more 
accurate than demonstration without its being noticed. (An. Post. 2.19, 99b23–27, translation 
modified) 
</ext> 
 
The first hypothesis is that our knowledge of them is already present in us without being 
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noticed (ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν [An. Post. 2.19, 99b25–26]). Here, it must be stressed that 
Aristotle does not even consider the possibility of the first principles being immediately 
accessible to us, as one might expect if they were self-evident propositions requiring no 
previous heuristic procedure. Therefore, as in Plato’s theory of recollection, if the principles 
are somehow known to us, we are not completely aware of them.28 Aristotle rejects this first 
hypothesis based on the fact that comprehension is the “most accurate” of all cognitive states. 
The degree of accuracy of noetic knowledge—whatever ‘accuracy’ means in this context—
excludes the possibility of possessing it without its possession being noticed. 
If our knowledge of principles is not already in us, it must “come about” (ἐγγίνονται 
[An. Post. 2.19, 99b25]) in one way or another. In the sequence of An. Post. 2.19, this second 
hypothesis is formulated in terms of learning: 
 
<ext> 
[T4] But if we get them [the states] without possessing them earlier, how could we come to 
acquire knowledge and to learn except from pre-existing knowledge? This is impossible, as I 
said in connection with demonstration. (An. Post. 2.19, 99b28–30, translation modified) 
</ext> 
 
In T4, Aristotle reminds us of T1, where he states that every “rational learning” (μάθησις 
διανοητικὴ) depends on pre-existing knowledge, insofar as an inference-based knowledge of 
a given truth depends on previous knowledge of the premises from which it is derived. 
Aristotle is explicitly claiming that our knowledge of the principles is itself the result of 
rational learning, and therefore depends on previously obtained knowledge. As a result, 
noetic knowledge cannot be the cognitive state that interrupts the infinite regress in T1. For 
that reason, one of Aristotle’s aims in An. Post. 2.19 is to identify a primitive cognitive 
capacity—namely, perception—that, being innate (σύμφυτον [An. Post. 2.19, 99b35]) and 
therefore independent of pre-existing knowledge, allows us to start off the process of μάθησις 
διανοητικὴ towards superior forms of cognition. 
Therefore, the cognitive disposition that interrupts the infinite regress in T1 is 
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perception, not comprehension. The crucial mistake here is to take Aristotle as offering in An. 
Post. 1.3 a solution to the kind of infinite regress that can be extracted from T1. In An. Post. 
1.3, as well as in other chapters such as An. Post. 1.19–22, Aristotle is discussing whether 
every scientific proposition is demonstrable. If we exclude the possibility of demonstrations 
proceeding in a circle—as Aristotle does in An. Post. 1.3, 72b25–73a20—, this question is 
equivalent to asking whether there can be infinite chains of explanatory connections in the 
world, which would entail that demonstrations would have to proceed ad infinitum. In An. 
Post. 2.19, in turn, Aristotle is not considering infinite chains of explanatory connections, but 
“rational learning” in general. The kind of regress that can be extracted from T1 is one in 
which every proposition that is (rationally) learned is obtained from premises that are 
themselves (rationally) learned. A different sort of regress is discussed in An. Post. 1.3, which 
occurs if every demonstrable truth is demonstrated from propositions that are themselves 
known by demonstration. Thus, we can distinguish two questions, each of which corresponds 
to a different kind of infinite regress: 
 
<ext> 
(Q1) Is it the case that every “rational” (inference-based) learning depends on pre-existing 
knowledge whose acquisition is itself “rational” (inference-based)? 
(Q2) Is it the case that every demonstration depends on premises that are themselves known 
by demonstration? 
</ext> 
 
(Q1) is answered negatively in An. Post. 2.19, and perception is the innate cognitive capacity 
that interrupts the regress. (Q2) is answered negatively in An. Post. 1.3, a proper proof being 
offered in An. Post. 1.19–22.29 Here, we are allowed to say that comprehension interrupts the 
regress, since it prevents demonstrations from proceeding ad infinitum. However, this answer 
to (Q2) is compatible with the fact that noetic knowledge is itself the result of μάθησις 
διανοητικὴ and depends on pre-existing knowledge. 
Again, the proponent of the Rationalist Account could object that, even if 
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comprehension is the result of “rational learning” based on pre-existing perceptual 
knowledge, no cognitive content provided by sensible experience can justify our 
comprehension of the principles, since comprehension is “more accurate” than perception and 
experience themselves. However, it is perfectly possible to affirm that sensible experience 
can be used to justify some knowledge of the principles and nonetheless deny that it could 
justify our comprehension of them. As the Interrelational Account argues, comprehension is 
knowing the principles as principles, that is, as premises from which other propositions can 
be demonstrated, but which are not themselves demonstrated from other propositions. In that 
sense, comprehension presupposes (without being reduced to) the knowledge that the 
principles are true. As we know from An. Post. 2.19, perception is an innate capacity that, 
together with memory, gives rise to experience and the grasp of universal truths (An. Post. 
2.19, 99b34–100b 5).30 Our knowledge of these universal truths is justified by induction (An. 
Post. 2.19, 100b3–5) as, for instance, Aristotle’s knowledge of the facts reported in the 
Historia Animalium (HA) is empirically and inductively justified. As has been noted, the 
treatise does not distinguish causally fundamental facts from derivative facts that can be 
explained from them, a task Aristotle undertakes only in proper demonstrative treatises such 
as de Partibus Animalium (PA) or de Generatione Animalium (GA).31 In other words, sensible 
experience gives us justified knowledge of the truth of the principles in the exact same way 
as it gives us justified knowledge of the truth of the theorems. However, for this very reason, 
it cannot give us comprehension of the principles, which involves not only recognizing them 
as truths, but also distinguishing them from the demonstrable propositions they explain. If so, 
the role Aristotle assigns to perception in An. Post. 2.19 does not contradict the Accuracy 
Claim, since he is not arguing that sensible experience alone can work as the foundation of 
noetic knowledge. 
If sensible experience and induction allow us to know only that the principles are true, 
what gives us proper noetic knowledge of them? As has been argued, An. Post. 2.19 does not 
offer a clear-cut answer to this question: for the reasons we have seen in the last paragraph, 
there must be a gap between the inductive grasp of universal truths and the acquisition of 
indemonstrable principles as such.32 In an intuitionist reading of the chapter, νοῦς appears as 
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a deus ex machina at An. Post. 2.19, 100b5–7, to fill this gap. The proponents of the 
Interrelational Account, in turn, are allowed to offer a much simpler and less arbitrary 
solution to this problem. Aristotle does not specify the missing step between the grasp of 
universal truths and proper noetic knowledge because this step has been previously discussed 
in the treatise.33 Let me spell this out. 
According to the Interrelational Account, comprehension is the knowledge of 
principles as principles, that is, as indemonstrable premises from which other truths are 
explained. Therefore, we cannot identify the principles as such independently of any 
demonstrative practice. In fact, a great part of Aristotle’s efforts in An. Post. 2 is focused on 
establishing this result. The philosopher affirms that definitions, understood as accounts of 
essence (τὸ τί ἐστιν), are the “principles of demonstration,” and restates that “there will not 
be demonstrations of principles,” since otherwise demonstrative syllogisms would proceed ad 
infinitum (An. Post. 2.3, 90b24–27). Therefore, the impossibility of demonstrating definitions 
is a crucial part of Aristotle’s foundationalism. For this reason, he discusses at length in An. 
Post. 2 whether or not definitions can be demonstrated. In An. Post. 2.8, he gives his final 
answer: a syllogism with a definitional sentence occurring as conclusion is merely “logical” 
(λογικὸς) and not a demonstration in the strict sense of the term, a result strong enough to 
block the threat of infinite regress. Nevertheless, Aristotle intends to show “in what way a 
demonstration [of what something is] is possible” (An. Post. 2.8, 93a15–16). In the rest of the 
chapter, he argues for a strict correspondence between the definition of a predicate P and the 
demonstration of a certain subject S being P. For instance, we explain why the noise we call 
“thunder” occurs in the clouds through the middle term “extinction of fire” (An. Post. 2.8, 
93a7–b14). The definition of thunder, in turn, is “noise of fire being extinguished in the 
clouds” (An. Post. 2.10, 94a5–6). Aristotle makes it clear that this correspondence is not just a 
coincidence between the results of two independent activities (defining and explaining).34 
Actually, says he, “without a demonstration you cannot get to know what something is” (An. 
Post. 2.8, 93b18): that is to say, producing demonstrations is precisely the way we come to 
know the essence of things.35 Since definitions are not properly demonstrated, our knowledge 
of them is not demonstrative, but noetic. Nevertheless, noetic and demonstrative knowledge 
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are interdependent cognitive states in the same way as defining and explaining are 
interdependent scientific practices. 
If essences are nothing more than ultimate causes, the missing step between the grasp 
of universal truths and noetic knowledge is the very practice of demonstrating, that is to say, 
the act of organizing a given body of truths based on their explanatory connections. In fact, 
Aristotle embraces this result quite explicitly in An. Pr. 1.30: 
 
<ext> 
[T5] The majority of principles for each science are peculiar to it. Consequently, it is for our 
experiences concerning each subject to provide the principles. I mean, for instance, that it is 
for astronomical experience to provide the principles of the science of astronomy (for when 
the phenomena had been sufficiently grasped, in this way astronomical demonstrations were 
discovered; and it is also similar concerning any other art or science whatsoever). 
Consequently, if the facts concerning each thing have been grasped we are already prepared 
to bring the demonstrations readily to light. For if nothing that truly belongs to things has 
been left out of the collection of facts, then concerning every fact of which there is a 
demonstration, we will be able to find that demonstration and demonstrate, while if it does 
not naturally have a demonstration, we will be able to make that evident. (An. Pr. 1.30, 
46a17–27) 
</ext> 
 
Along the lines of An. Post. 2.19, T5 also claims that it is the job of experience to give us the 
proper principles of each science (τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἐμπειρίας ἐστὶ παραδοῦναι 
[An. Pr. 1.30, 46a17–19]). Again, we do not need to read this text as committing Aristotle to a 
strictly empiricist account of the acquisition of scientific knowledge. Actually, the passage 
seems to imply that experience is what allows us to know that the principles are true, whereas 
demonstration (i.e. explaining) is what makes us know that they are principles: only after all 
relevant facts in the domain have been grasped by experience do we become ready to make 
explanatory relations clear (ἡμέτερον ἤδη τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἑτοίμως ἐμφανίζειν [An. Pr. 1.30, 
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46a23–24]) and, therefore, distinguish demonstrable truths from indemonstrable ones. 
Thus, in comparison to its rationalist alternative, the Interrelational Account avoids an 
internal conflict between An. Post. 2.19 and other important passages of the Analytics that 
also concern the grasp of indemonstrable principles (more importantly, An. Post. 2.8 and An 
Pr. 1.30). Additional evidence—but perhaps not decisive, we must admit—can be found in 
Aristotle’s own scientific practice. His biological treatises, for instance, seem to follow quite 
strictly the script laid down in T5. As we have seen, the well-articulated explanations in PA or 
in GA presuppose the vast collection of (previously obtained) facts presented in HA. For 
instance, being blooded is never recognized in HA as part of the essence of sanguineous 
animals.36 However, in PA, one of the ultimate reasons for fishes having fins and not feet, or 
birds being two-footed, or deer and dolphins being long-lived, is their being blooded, which 
makes Aristotle take this property as part of their essences.37 If so, Aristotle can confidently 
state: “that some animals are blooded while some are bloodless will be in the account 
defining their essence.”38 The reason why such a confident statement appears in PA, but not 
in HA, is that we cannot know that birds and dolphins are essentially sanguineous until we 
realize that their being blooded is a causally fundamental fact about them.39 
Strong textual evidence seems to corroborate the thesis that comprehension and 
demonstrative knowledge are somehow interdependent cognitive states: on one hand, 
demonstrative knowledge requires noetic knowledge of indemonstrable premises; on the 
other, the acquisition of noetic knowledge involves some demonstrative practice. However, 
we still need to spell out how exactly (and to what extent) these states are interdependent. A 
special difficult makes this task even more pressing. Aristotle affirms that comprehension is 
“more accurate” than demonstrative knowledge, a claim that is motivated by the fact that the 
principles are “better known” than the conclusions and “convincing in their own right,” while 
demonstrable truths become “known” and “convincing” only through the principles (An. 
Post. 1.2, 72a25–b4; Top. 1.1, 100b20–21). In other words, the Accuracy Claim suggests that 
demonstrative knowledge is asymmetrically dependent on the knowledge of indemonstrable 
premises. Interpreters advocating the Interrelational Account may claim that this asymmetry 
is only the reflection of the fact that the explanatory relation between principles and 
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demonstrable truths is asymmetrical: the principles are explanatory of the theorems and not 
vice-versa—even though noetic knowledge involves understanding how principles explain 
other propositions. However, despite being true, this reply seems too simple and unsatisfying, 
since it does not explain why Aristotle speaks in terms of “accuracy,” or why he describes 
causally fundamental truths (truths prior in nature) as “better known” and “more convincing” 
than demonstrable truths (truths posterior in nature). 
 
 
4. Reinterpreting the Accuracy Claim. 
 
As we have seen in section 2, one of the meanings of ἀκριβές that has been associated with 
the Accuracy Claim is that of certainty, clarity or trustworthiness. However, the term can be 
used in other ways. As has been noted, ἀκριβές denotes quite generally whatever is of “good 
epistemic quality.”40 In some contexts, the relevant quality is precision. Explanations or 
definitions that are not at the proper level of generality, for being either too general or too 
specific, should be discharged as “inaccurate.”41 The notion of precision might be useful to 
compare alternative accounts of the same item, as, for instance, alternative definitions of the 
same concept or alternative explanations of the same explanandum. However, the Accuracy 
Claim compares different kinds of cognitive states (noetic and demonstrative knowledge) 
which admit different kinds of objects (principles and demonstrable truths, respectively). It 
does not make sense to claim that the (noetic) knowledge a scientist has of a definition is 
more “precise” (in the sense of being at the right level of generality) than the (demonstrative) 
knowledge she has of a demonstrable proposition. 
I would like to explore another option. According to the Liddell–Scott–Jones Lexicon, 
ἀκριβές often refers to what is in “perfect condition” or “consummate,” while the verb 
ἀκριβόω can mean “to be or become perfect” (in the passive voice) or “to understand 
thoroughly” (in the active). As Zabarella notes, ἀκριβές denotes not only certainty, but also 
“perfection” or “completeness.”42 Aristotle uses the term in this sense as well.43 One 
occurrence is particularly relevant to our present discussion: 
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<ext> 
[T6] To demonstrate something more universally is to demonstrate it through a middle term 
which is nearer to the principles. Immediates are nearest—indeed they are principles. Thus, if 
a demonstration which proceeds from a principle is more accurate [ἀκριβεστέρα] than one 
which does not proceed from a principle, then a demonstration which proceeds more from a 
principle is more accurate than one which is less so. But a more universal demonstration is of 
this type. Hence universal demonstrations will be superior. (An. Post. 1.24, 86a14–19, 
translation modified) 
</ext> 
 
For Aristotle, a universal demonstration that explains, for instance, why all triangles have the 
sum of internal angles equal to two right angles (hereafter, 2R) is superior to a syllogism that 
explains only why isosceles triangles have 2R. After all, triangles have 2R not in virtue of 
being isosceles or equilateral, but in virtue of being triangles.44 If so, as argued in T6, 
attempts to demonstrate the 2R-theorem about all triangles universally are more likely to 
reach the relevant explanatory principles.45 Aristotle also claims that demonstrations 
proceeding from a principle are “more accurate” (ἀκριβεστέρα) than demonstrations that only 
involve premises that are themselves demonstrable. Thus, he argues, a demonstration which 
proceeds “more” from a principle is more accurate than a demonstration that is “less” so: the 
closer a demonstrative chain gets to reaching the immediate premises that block the regress, 
the more accurate is the knowledge it produces. If “interrelational” interpretations are correct, 
noetic and demonstrative knowledge are better described as types of understanding, since 
they involve identifying the place of a given proposition in a web of causally connected 
truths. If so, demonstrations containing only demonstrable premises are incomplete or 
“inaccurate,” since a complete and “accurate” understanding of a conclusion requires 
connecting it to the appropriate principles. 
It might be relevant to point out that this notion of ἀκρίβεια as completeness is not 
technical or exclusive to the Analytics. In De Caelo 2.5, 287b22–288a2, for instance, 
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Aristotle asks why does the heaven of fixed stars moves in one direction rather than the other, 
and states: “either this is itself a principle or there is a principle for it.” If principles can be 
recognized as such in themselves, how could Aristotle be in doubt about whether this fact is a 
principle or a demonstrable truth? The philosopher often complains about the lack of 
empirical evidence in the domain of astronomy—especially in comparison to biological 
sciences (PA 1.5, 644b22–645a4; Cael. 2.3, 286a3–6). It is precisely the lack of evidence that 
prevents Aristotle from determining whether the heavens moving in the direction they do is a 
principle or not. As we have seen in T5, the identification of principles as such involves 
realizing that there are no other truths from which they could be explained, a task which 
requires previous apprehension of all the other facts in the domain. Further on, Aristotle 
affirms that we should be grateful if anyone succeeds in finding “more accurate necessities” 
(ἀκριβεστέρας ἀνάγκας [Cael. 2.5, 287b34–288a1]). It is hard to determine what ‘necessities’ 
means here46, but the context strongly indicates that the relevant meaning of ‘accurate’ is the 
one I have suggested. Aristotle’s predicament in this passage is the incapacity to decide 
whether or not a given truth is a principle. He can neither explain why the proposition at stake 
is true nor determine whether it is an indemonstrable premise. Therefore, his understanding 
of this truth and of all the other truths that are explained from it is incomplete and, in this 
sense, inaccurate. 
But how could this use of ἀκριβές help us understand the Accuracy Claim? First of 
all, we need to distinguish two different types of ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική, or two different 
levels in which one can possess demonstrative knowledge:47 
 
<ext> 
1. The cognitive state of someone who demonstrates a given conclusion from appropriate 
principles. 
2. The cognitive state of someone who has demonstrative knowledge (of type 1) of the 
totality (or a significant number) of demonstrable truths in a given domain, including noetic 
knowledge of the corresponding principles—i.e. ἐπιστήμη as a scientific expertise. 
</ext> 
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My suggestion is that the Accuracy Claim is comparing the degree of ἀκρίβεια (understood as 
completeness or comprehensiveness) of the demonstrative knowledge a scientist has of a 
given conclusion c (type 1 of ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική), on one hand, and the noetic knowledge 
she has of a principle p from which c is demonstrated, on the other. By acquiring 
demonstrative knowledge of c, the scientist becomes able to connect c to a set of 
indemonstrable principles, p among them. However, it is the noetic knowledge of p (and of 
other principles used in the demonstration) that allows her to connect c to the body of science 
as a whole: as T5 indicates, having noetic knowledge of p involves grasping a complex web 
of interrelated truths and verifying that p cannot be explained by any of them. For example, a 
demonstration of the theorem that triangles have 2R is relatively easy to follow. If so, even a 
non-geometer can see that this theorem is grounded, among other things, in the fact that 
triangles are three-sided rectilinear figures. Only the geometer, however, has the holistic 
outlook that allows her to know that triangles are essentially three-sided rectilinear figures, 
that is to say, that this is a truth about triangles that explains other truths about them, but 
which is not explained by more basic truths. Therefore, having noetic knowledge of the fact 
that triangles are three-sided rectilinear figures is what makes the geometer’s understanding 
of the theorem part of a holistic apprehension of geometrical truths in general. It might be 
useful to consider one of Aristotle’s own scientific explanations. Absence of bile is the reason 
why deer and dolphins (among other animals) are long-lived, for bile, says Aristotle, is a 
residue of impure blood affecting the state of the liver, which is a vital organ to blooded 
animals (PA 4.2, 677a30–b10). Anyone reading this particular passage becomes aware of the 
connection between the longevity of dolphins and the fact that they are blooded animals. 
However, a complete and “accurate” understanding of dolphins being long-lived requires 
knowing that they are, as we have seen, essentially blooded. Acquiring noetic knowledge of 
this indemonstrable fact involves grasping the fundamental causal role that blood plays in the 
whole body of truths presented in PA. If so, the reason why the biologist has a comprehensive 
understanding of the longevity of dolphins, as a part of biology as a whole, is her 
comprehensive understanding of the fact that dolphins are essentially sanguineous. 
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In sum, the demonstrative knowledge of a conclusion c is “accurate,” in the sense of 
being comprehensive or complete, because the noetic knowledge of p (a principle from which 
c is demonstrated) is “accurate” in the same sense. Now, if this is the case, noetic knowledge 
of p is “more accurate” than demonstrative knowledge of c, at least according to Aristotle. In 
An. Post. 1.2, 72a25–32, the philosopher states the following rule: if x is F because y is F, 
then y is “more F” than x—for instance, if I love London only because I love its museums, 
then I love its museums more than I love London. In this passage, Aristotle uses this rule to 
justify his claim that the principles are “more convincing” than the theorems. If I am right, 
the relevant πίστις should not be understood as our “conviction” about the truth-value of 
principles and theorems, but our “conviction” about their roles within an organized body of 
truths.48 We can explain in similar terms the claim that the principles are “better known” 
(γνωριμώτεραι) than the respective conclusions: demonstrable truths become “known” 
because the principles are “known,” the relevant γνώσις being not mere knowledge, but 
scientific understanding, that is, grasping the place of a given proposition in a web of 
explanatorily connected truths.49 
With this interpretation of the Accuracy Claim, it becomes easier to specify in which 
sense demonstrative and noetic knowledge can be taken as interdependent. Acquiring 
comprehension of a principle involves the practice of demonstrating, that is to say, displaying 
causal connections among previously obtained truths. This procedure, however, does not 
require pre-established comprehension of the principles, so there is no vicious circularity in 
Aristotle’s theory. What does require proper comprehension of the principles is the more 
robust understanding that expert scientists have of any theorem in their field. When a scientist 
exhibits this kind of understanding through a demonstration, she is not just displaying 
isolated causal relations, but connecting a demonstrable proposition to a set of principles of 
which she already has noetic knowledge, which amounts to connecting it to the science as 
whole.50 On the other hand, the inquirer, in her way to become a scientist, engages in a kind 
of demonstrative activity that is incomplete—and, in this sense, “inaccurate”—in comparison 
to the full-fledged demonstrative understanding she acquires once she has grasped the 
principles and distinguished them from demonstrable truths. 
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Nevertheless, if our explanation of the Accuracy Claim is correct, there is a sense in 
which comprehension is not more accurate than demonstrative knowledge, since noetic 
knowledge cannot be more complete than the scientific expertise as a whole (type 2 of 
ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική). In fact, Aristotle seems to have acknowledged this result in the very 
last (and obscure) lines of the An. Post.: 
 
<ext> 
[T7] And yet, the principle of science [i.e. comprehension] is related to the principle in the 
same way as the [demonstrative] science as a whole is related to the subject matter as a whole 
[καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ [ἐπιστήμης] τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν, ἡ δὲ [ἐπιστήμη] πᾶσα ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πᾶν 
πρᾶγμα.] (An. Post. 2.19, 100b15–17, translation modified) 
</ext> 
 
Of course, there is nothing forcing us to read T7 as part of the discussion about accuracy. 
Aristotle might be saying something quite simple: if comprehension gives us the principles or 
starting points from which we formulate demonstrations, we might take comprehension itself 
as the principle or starting-point of demonstrative sciences. There are reasons to prefer 
another reading, though. First, Aristotle had already characterised νοῦς as ἐπιστήμης ἀρχὴ in 
the preceding lines (An. Post. 2.19, 100b14–15; see An. Post. 1.3, 72b23–25), so, in this 
reading, T7 would be just a repetition of what has been just said. Second, T7 immediately 
follows the statement and defence of the Accuracy Claim (An. Post. 2.19, 100b5–15), which 
suggests that Aristotle is still discussing the accuracy of scientific cognitive states. More 
importantly, why does he make it clear that he is talking about ἐπιστήμη and its πρᾶγμα as a 
whole (πᾶσα)? I believe Aristotle is relying on the distinction between the two types of 
ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική I have discriminated above. Ross paraphrases the passage in the 
following way: “science as a whole grasps its objects with the same certainty with which 
intuitive reason grasps the first principles” (Ross in An. Post. 678). If we replace Ross’s 
intuitionist vocabulary, Aristotle’s words in T7 can be interpreted as follows: noetic 
knowledge grasps a principle with the same degree of accuracy (understood as 
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comprehensiveness and completeness) as demonstrative science as a whole (type 2 of 
ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική) grasps its subject matter as whole (not one particular theorem, but the 
entire body of scientific propositions). If this reading is correct, we can provide a coherent 
reading of the last paragraph of An. Post. 2.19 (100b5–17). First, Aristotle argues that the 
comprehension of a given principle is more accurate than the demonstrative knowledge of 
the corresponding conclusion (type 1 of ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική). Yet, he continues in T7 
(reading an adversative καὶ in An. Post. 2.19, 100b15), comprehension is as accurate as 
demonstrative knowledge, understood as the mastery of a scientific discipline (type 2 of 
ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική). 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Perhaps the main source of resistance against the Interrelational Account, despite all the 
textual evidence in its favour, is that it recognizes some sort of interdependence between 
comprehension and demonstrative knowledge. This interdependence seems to turn the 
attainment of scientific knowledge into a viciously circular process, an outcome that Aristotle 
explicitly tried to avoid. After all, he argues that we get to know a theorem scientifically by 
demonstrating it from principles that are “better known” than the theorem itself, which leads 
him to claim that comprehension is “more accurate” than demonstrative knowledge. I have 
attempted to show in which way these two cognitive states can be taken as interdependent 
without contradicting Aristotle’s reasons for advancing the Accuracy Claim. The acquisition 
of noetic knowledge depends on demonstration in the sense of requiring the apprehension of 
causal connections among previously obtained truths. Nevertheless, a proper demonstrative 
understanding of a given proposition is incomplete—and, in this sense, “inaccurate”—
without noetic knowledge of the appropriate principles. Even if we know the demonstrations 
explaining why triangles have 2R or why dolphins are long-lived, our knowledge of them 
does not makes us geometers or biologists. For us, these demonstrations do nothing more 
than connect a given conclusion to a set of premises that explain why it is the case. On the 
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other hand, proper geometers or biologists have noetic knowledge of the corresponding 
principles: they not only know that triangles are rectilinear figures and dolphins are blooded 
animals, but they also understand why they are essentially so. Expert scientists recognize 
principles as principles after having apprehended all the truths in the relevant domain and 
organized them based on their causal relations. For them, the demonstration is the vehicle by 
which they connect a given conclusion not only to a set of premises from which it is 
deductively derived, but to the body of science in its entirety.51 
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understand them in the act of explaining by them, i.e. just insofar as we understand them qua 
principles and not qua explicanda” (Aryeh Kosman, “Understanding,” 389). See David 
Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, 266–67; and Miira Tuominen, “Back to II 19,” 
141. 
13 See Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, 265–73 and Breno A. Zuppolini, 
“Aristotle’s Foundationalism.” 
14 Bronstein, Knowledge and Learning, 79. 
15 Frede, “Aristotle’s Rationalism”; Greg Bayer, “Coming to Know”; Ferejohn, 
“Empiricism”; cf. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, 136–37. 
16 See Jonathan Barnes in An. Post. 261–62. 
17 For intuitionist readings, see David Ross in An. Post. 49, 85; Charles Kahn, “The Role of 
Nous”; Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, 134–37; Bayer, “Coming to Know.” For other 
interpretations, see Lesher, “The Meaning of ΝΟΥΣ”; Barnes in An. Post. 267–70; Charles, 
Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, 265–73; Bronstein, “Origin and Aim”; Bronstein, 
Preprint Version: forthcoming in the Journal of the History of Philosophy 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Knowledge and Learning, 225–47; Breno A. Zuppolini, “Aristotle’s Foundationalism.” It is 
worth noticing that Ferejohn, despite defending several claims that are along the lines of what 
I am calling the Rationalist Account, rejects interpretations that describe νοῦς as “intuition” 
or “mental vision,” as if it were a faculty that “generates flashes of ‘insight’ concurrently 
with, but independently of, the operation of the perceptual faculties” (Ferejohn, 
“Empiricism,” 79). 
18 Ferejohn, “Empiricism,” 66. 
19 This is precisely how Ferejohn, “Empiricism,” 66, formulates Aristotle’s statement in An. 
Post. 1.1, 71a1–2. 
20 See Barnes’s discussion on the distinction between διανοητικός and νοητικός (Barnes in 
An. Post. 81). 
21 Ferejohn affirms: “In Posterior Analytics I.3, Aristotle considers the implications of (P1) 
for his theory of demonstrative knowledge,” where (P1) is “every piece of knowledge arises 
out of some pre-existent knowledge” (“Empiricism,” 66). See also Barnes in An. Post. 104. 
22 Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, 134. 
23 Instead, the proponents of the Interrelational Account may argue that Aristotle, by using the 
expression μετὰ λόγου, is just stressing that demonstrative knowledge of a given conclusion c 
involves an explanation (λόγος) of c. 
24 Irwin, for instance, affirms: “His [Aristotle’s] conception of demonstration embodies a 
foundationalist conception of justification. The right sort of foundation must avoid both 
infinite regress and vicious circle; and Aristotle can meet this requirement only if he 
recognizes self-evident first principles grasped by intuition” (Irwin, Aristotle’s First 
Principles, 134, emphasis added). 
25 See Owen Goldin, “Circular,” 200. 
26 For other interpretations that distinguish Aristotelian explanation from mere justification, 
see Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge,” 101; Kosman, “Understanding”; 
C.C.W. Taylor, “Aristotle’s Epistemology,” 120; McKirahan, Principles and Proofs, 209–31; 
Lesher, “Aristotle on ἐπιστήμη as understanding,” 46; Oswaldo Porchat Pereira, Ciência e 
dialética em Aristóteles, 93–8; Lucas Angioni, “Necessary Principles”; Angioni, 
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“Definition”; Bronstein, Knowledge and Learning; Goldin, “Circular,” 200; Salmieri, 
“Aristotelian epistêmê,” 2–3; Zuppolini, “Aristotle’s Foundationalism,” 192. 
27 See Burnyeat “Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge,” 127–28; R.J. Hankinson, Cause 
and Explanation, 161. 
28 Barnes in An. Post. 261; Bronstein, “Origin and Aim,” 38–9; Bronstein Knowledge and 
Learning, 234; Bronstein, “Aristotle’s Critique”; Zuppolini, “Aristotle’s Foundationalism,” 
193. 
29 On this proof, see D.W. Hamlyn, “Aristotle on Predication”; Jonathan Lear, Aristotle and 
Logical Theory, 15–33; Michael Scanlan, “Compactness”; Adam Crager, Meta-logic.  
30 I have argued in “Aristotle’s Foundationalism,” 195-99, that the role of induction in An. 
Post. 2.19 goes beyond a process of concept-formation. On this debate, see Ross in An. Post. 
675–76; Kahn, “The Role of Nous,” 391–95; McKirahan, Principles and Proofs, 246; Barnes 
in An. Post. 264–65; Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, 264n37; Bronstein, “Origin 
and Aim,” 58n67; Bronstein, Knowledge and Learning, 246n63. 
31 See James G. Lennox, “Divide and Explain”; Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 39–71; 
Bronstein, Knowledge and Learning, 126–27. For a detailed discussion and status quaestionis 
about the role of HA in Aristotle’s biology, see Allan Gotthelf, Teleology, 261–92. 
32 See Kahn, “The Role of Nous,” 396–97; Bronstein, “Origin and Aim”; Bronstein, 
Knowledge and Learning, 225–47. 
33 See Bronstein, “Origin and Aim,” and Bronstein, Knowledge and Learning, 225–47, for a 
detailed defense of this claim, to which I am very much indebted. However, he believes that 
the essences of attributes and processes (such as thunder or eclipse) are revealed by 
demonstrations (as argued in An. Post. 2.8–10), whereas the essences of subject-kinds (such 
as man or horse) are grasped by induction and division (An. Post. 2.13). In other words, 
Bronstein argues that at least the essences of subject-kinds can be known as such 
independently of their explanatory role in demonstrations (I have objected to this aspect of 
Bronstein’s interpretation in Zuppolini, “Aristotle’s Foundationalism,” 203–4, and Zuppolini, 
“Review,” 182–85). Still, Bronstein also claims that this non-explanatory grasp of the essence 
is “non-noetic,” which allows us to classify him as a member of the Interrelational school. 
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34 For a systematic defence of this thesis, see Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. See 
also Kung, “Aristotle on Essence and Explanation,” 168–72; Charles, “Definition and 
Explanation”; Williams & Charles, “Essence, Modality”; Peramatzis, Priority, 180–88; 
Peramatzis, “Science and Metaphysics”; Angioni, “Necessary Principles”; Zuppolini, 
“Aristotle’s Foundationalism,” 201–4. 
35 I believe that this relation between definition and demonstration is true not only for 
attributes and processes such as thunder, but also for subject-kinds, pace Ross in An. Post. 
633; Bronstein, Knowledge and Learning, 131–43. In Metaph. 7.17 and 8.2–4, for instance, 
Aristotle explicitly extends the model presented in the Analytics to include hylomorphic 
substances. See Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, 274–309; Peramatzis, Priority, 
180–88; Peramatzis, “Science and Metaphysics.” As I argued in Zuppolini, “Aristotle’s 
Foundationalism,” 204, there is a sense in which the “interdependence” thesis holds good 
even for subjects that are not analysable as compounds of form and matter: in De Anima 1.1, 
e.g. Aristotle states that the definition of a substance is “dialectical and empty” if it does not 
lead us to know the substance’s derivative properties (402b16–403a2). In other words, 
knowing the essence of substances involves grasping its explanatory connections to their 
demonstrable attributes. 
36 The closest we get to this recognition is the affirmation that the nature (φύσις) of the blood 
and the veins “looks like a starting point” (ἀρχῇ ἔοικεν [HA 3.2, 511b11–12]), in a context in 
which Aristotle seems concerned with exposition of facts, not explanation. 
37 PA 4.2, 677a30–b1; 4.12 693b5–8; 4.13, 695b17–22. 
38 PA 4.5, 678a33–34; cf. 1.3, 643a1–5; 2.4, 651a11–14. 
39 It goes beyond the purpose of this paper to discuss whether or not material features such as 
being blooded can be taken as explanatorily primitive. Lennox states: “if Aristotle is inclined 
to decide what is in the account of a thing’s being on the basis of explanatory primitiveness, 
and if he is willing, in natural science, to include matter in definitions, then we could expect 
that being blooded or being bloodless would indeed be in the substantial being of animals 
identified at a sufficiently general level” (Philosophy of Biology, 202n11). For other 
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references on this topic and for a criticism of the view that matter can be explanatorily basic, 
see Gelber, “Facts about Matter.” 
40 Barnes in An. Post. 189. 
41 See EN 8.7, 1159a3–4; Metaph. 13.5, 1080a9–11 (in contrast to λογικωτέρων); Pol. 3.4, 
1276b24–25; GC 2.6, 333b22–26 (in contrast to ἁπλῶς and μαλακῶς); Rh. 1.4, 1359b2–5; 
3.8, 1408b30–32. As Lesher, “Saphêneia,” 145–48, has argued, this is a meaning that ἀκριβές 
shares with σαφές. Thus, the fact that Aristotle takes the two expressions as synonyms (see 
Top. 2.4, 111a8–10) does not count as strong evidence in favour of a “rationalist” reading of 
the Accuracy Claim. Moreover, Lesher claims that σαφές also refers to “the attainment of full 
scientific knowledge” (“Saphêneia,” 148–56). If he is correct, this is a meaning that σαφές 
shares with ἀκριβές as well—the meaning according to which the Accuracy Claim should be 
interpreted, as I argue below. 
42 “akribeiam, quae non solam certitudinem significat, sed cum perfectione” (Zabarella, In 
Post. Anal., 168B). 
43 E.g. our understanding of a given subject is said to be ἀκριβές when it is detailed, complex 
and meticulous (Top. 6.4, 141b12–14; cf. Rh. 3.12, 1414a7–13). In EN 6.7, 1141a12–20, 
Aristotle affirms that wisdom (σοφία), understood as a combination of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη, is 
ἀκριβεστάτη in the sense of not being a partial or restricted knowledge (κατὰ μέρος), but 
complete and consummate (κεφαλήν). 
44 An. Pr. 1.35, 48a33–36; An. Post. 1.4, 73b25–74a3; 1.5, 74b2–4; 1.24, 85b5–13 
45 In An. Post. 1.24, 86a19–21, Aristotle clarifies the point schematically: a demonstration 
that explains why a given figure (D) has 2R (A) through a middle term (C) that applies 
exclusively to isosceles triangles is inferior to a demonstration that contains a middle term 
(B) applying to all triangles. I believe the relevant concept of universality here is the one 
discussed in An. Post. 1.4, 73b25–74a3 (see also An. Post. 1.5, 74a16–b4; 1.24, 85b4–15; 
b23–27; 85b38–86a3; 2.17, 99a30–b7). I have dealt with this subject in Zuppolini, “Aristotle 
on Per se Accidents,” 130–32. 
46 Angioni, “Progresso,” 323–28, convincingly argues that what is at stake here is not the 
necessity of logical consequence, but the necessity of explaining phenomena from 
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appropriate principles, i.e. “necessities” are the principles required to explain a given 
phenomenon appropriately. He also claims that “accuracy” is the property of explanations 
that “hit the target,” in the sense of being correct or appropriate. Although I do not disagree 
with this reading, I believe it must be stressed that the relevant “correction” or 
“appropriateness” depends on either (i) connecting the fact under investigation to a principle 
that is recognized as such or (ii) recognizing the fact itself as a principle. See An. Post. 1.2, 
71b19–32, where Aristotle says that demonstrative premises are “appropriate” (οἰκεῖαι) when 
“true, primary, immediate, more familiar than, prior to and explanatory of the conclusion.” As 
I have been arguing, neither (i) or (ii) can be accomplished by analysing the proposition in 
itself, isolated from other truths. 
47 Cf. Lesher, “Aristotle on ἐπιστήμη as understanding,” 47–50; Salmieri, “Aristotelian 
epistêmê,” 2. 
48 See Goldin, “Circular,” 212–13; Berrón, “Claves,” 17–18. 
49 See Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge,” 127–32. 
50 One can argue that these are two meanings of ‘demonstrating’ and ‘demonstration.’ Hence, 
there would not be an interdependence relation properly speaking, since the “demonstration” 
on which comprehension depends is not the same “demonstration” that depends on 
comprehension. I have myself explored the distinction between two meanings of 
‘demonstration’ before (Zuppolini, “Aristotle’s Foundationalism,” 198–99; cf. Bronstein, 
Knowledge and Learning, 41). However, I no longer think that there is a difference between 
meanings, but only between incomplete (or inaccurate) demonstrations, i.e. the grasp of 
isolated causal relations, and complete (or accurate) demonstrations, which involves 
comprehension of the principles. 
51 I presented drafts of this paper at the University of Campinas, the Federal University of 
Goiás, and the Federal University of Uberlândia. Many thanks to all participants, including 
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